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1 Abstract
In this paper I explore the relationship between boosting and neural networks. We see that our
adaptation of ADABOOST.MM for neural networks results in a consistent increase in accuracy, in
the nonadversarial setting. This provides a way to increase the accuracy of any model, without
modification to the model itself, making it very easy. In addition, we attempt to use these techniques
to improve adversarial robustness, that is, a model’s performance while under an adversarial attack.
While our ensemble does not have a large increase in adversarial accuracy with the addition of weak
learners, the ensemble has increased accuracy on non-adversarial examples. The accuracy of an
adversarial model on non-adversarial examples is very important in the real world, and we present
an easy way to increase that accuracy.
2 Introduction
Machine learning classifiers are now all around us, informing self driving cars, diagnosing disease,
trading stocks and more. As these classifiers begin to take on more mission-critical applications,
it will be increasingly important that their predictions are correct. However, more than just being
correct, it is important that the classifiers are correct even when an adversary is trying to fool them,
perhaps with malicious intent. For instance, an image classifier can easily be fooled into claiming
that a picture of a stop sign is in fact a green light just by slightly modifying the image it receives.
These modifications can even be so minor that a human cannot tell the difference.. This leads itself
to many problems when these models are used in critical applications, for instance, someone could
Page 1
Simar Kareer Effect of Boosting on Adversarial Robustness
cleverly design a sticker to put on a stop sign, convincing the car that it is in fact a green light and
cause an accident.
The fact that these image classifiers could easily be fooled was brought into the limelight by (Szegedy
et al), and was furthered by (Goodfellow et al), in which they began to understand how to create
these fooling images, known as adversarial examples. Moreover, Goodfellow’s work proposed a
method known as the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) to create these examples. As research
progressed, further techniques were created. One notable adversarial attack from (Madry et al)
is Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). Using PGD to create adversarial examples performs very
well, but takes a long time. In an attempt to speed this up, (Wong et al) created a framework
based on Goodfellows FGSM, but it incorporated randomness cleverly to improve performance
significantly. Specifically, in standard FGSM, the adversarial perturbation ∆ used for minimatch
T is initialized to match the adversarial delta calculated for minimatch T − 1. But in the Wong
paper they recognized that this was not effective, and they instead randomly initialize ∆ for each
minibatch. This approach is very fast to run, but is a bit worse than PGD based training. Thus,
to improve upon this, better accuracy would be ideal.
This study aims to improve upon this accuracy by considering boosting. Boosting, first introduced
by (Schapire) is a technique for combining multiple models together known as “weak learners” to
then produce one very high performing “strong learner”. In this study we aim to show how the
ADABOOST.MM algorithm (Mukherjee and Schapire) can be used to improve upon both regular
and adversarial accuracy. This technique has not been used before on neural networks, and with
some modifications it yields strong results. Specifically, we demonstrate that we can increase the
accuracy of a state of the art learning algorithm by applying ADABOOST.MM on top of it. This
is especially novel, because as new state of the art adversarial learning algorithms are formed, this
technique to improve them will remain relevant and easy to use.
3 Literature Review
Adversarial robustness was first put into the spotlight by (Szegedy et al), discovering that neural
network based image classifiers could be easily broken. A classic example of this is for a neural
network to confidently state that an image of a cat is in fact a laundry dryer by making changes to
the cat image that a human could not even detect. This phenomenon opened up a lot of research
regarding how to prevent models from being fooled, and why models can be fooled in the first place.
A common way to increase the accuracy of a model is to boost multiple smaller models. Boosting is
a technique first presented by (Schapire), and was very commonly used in earlier machine learning
literature. There is a strong theoretical background that would suggest combining that boosting can
improve adversarial accuracy, for instance in (Abernethy et al). Ultimately, looking at adversarial
robustness from the lens of boosting has the potential to result in greatly decreased training times
and increase accuracy.
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Boosting provides a general formulation for combining models, but it is often used in a limited con-
text, leaving much room to explore its place in deep learning. Boosting was introduced by (Schapire)
in 1999, and was formulated for the multiclass setting in an algorithm called ADABOOST.MM much
later by (Mukherjee and Schapire) in 2011. For those unfamiliar, the binary setting refers to when
there are two classes of images as opposed to the multiclass setting where there can be as many
as desired. Multiclass boosting is very important, because image classification is almost always
multiclass. Although boosting is a relatively old technique in the history of machine learning, it
took until 2011 in Mukherjee’s paper, for a strong theoretical basis for multiclass boosting to be
formulated. There were other attempts like (Hastie et al) which proposed the SAMME multiclass
boosting algorithm in 2006. SAMME has since been used frequently, but Mukherjee’s paper shows
that SAMME is less effective than ADABOOST.MM, which suggests that improvements could be
made by using ADABOOST.MM instead. The main paper which attempts to combine boosting
and neural networks was (Schwenk and Bengio), however this paper was released in 2000, far before
Schapire and Mukherjee were able to refine their algorithm to the multiclass setting. Additionally,
there is a more recent paper (Badirli et al) which attempts to gradient boost neural networks,
which is a slightly different technique. They do not however offer results on the standard training
sets, namely CIFAR10 and imagenet, so it is difficult to evaluate its performance. Nonetheless,
neural networks and boosting have not been studied together very commonly, as seen by the lack of
literature here. Now that boosting theory has become far more mature, this relationship is worth
looking into.
The adversarial robustness problem has largely been approached in the same way since its concep-
tion, and progress in the field is marked by generating adversarial examples faster and faster. As
noted, the problem of adversarial robustness was first put into view by (Szegedy et al). This paper
was followed up by (Goodfellow et al) and (Kurakin et al), in which they describe techniques to
train models robustly. These techniques rely on injecting quickly generated adversarial examples
into training, so that the model would also learn these examples. The main problem with these tech-
niques is that they didn’t reach high enough adversarial accuracy. This led to further research like
with (Madry et al), introducing the PGD technique. This achieves very high adversarial accuracy,
but requires very long training time, making it a strong baseline of techniques. These experiments
lead the deep learning community to ask whether one could achieve PGD level accuracy in the
same training time as a standard model, essentially making this the gold standard.
The research following this has begun to strike a middle ground, but is lacking in theoretical basis,
requires a lot of hyperparameter tuning, and still does not quite reach PGD levels of accuracy. The
paper by (Shafahi et al) is a good example in this space, where they claim that they add no extra
time to model training, but they actually have to train on the same data multiple times, making it
less efficient than the proceeding (Wong et al) paper. Wong’s technique is similar to Goodfellow’s
FGSM, but instead, the adversarial ∆ is randomly initialized for each minibatch, whereas in FGSM
it uses the delta from the previous minibatch. When I went and reproduced Wong’s results, the
fast convergence seemed very tied to the hyperparameters I used. So even though training time
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may have been fast, it must have taken them a long time to come upon those hyperparameters. In
addition, their accuracy still wasn’t as good as PGD. This leaves a gap in the research, seeking for
easily tunable hyperparameters, as well as increased accuracy. Boosting provides guarantees that
given a sufficient model, you should in time reach very high accuracy. In addition, the individual
hyperparameters shouldn’t matter very much, since the only requirement is that each individual
model does better than average. Thus there is reason to believe that boosting in this context could
both increase accuracy and decrease the amount of time needed to tune parameters.
These current drawbacks of adversarial learning are what sparked recent interest in the subject.
In (Abernethy et al) the authors attempt to create a general boosting framework that takes into
account adversarial robustness. This framework is promising because boosting is described as a zero
sum game of two players, and in a sense, adversarial robustness can also be viewed as a two player
game where the model and a model fooler play against each other. The main problem here is that
the experiments were not very clear or well documented. We attempted to replicate these results
on a simple model known as decision trees, however the method Abernethy proposed did not seem
to work, opening a large research project to formulate a better adversarial boosting framework.
This led to multiclass boosting based on Mukherjee’s work, as it is more theoretically grounded.
However, one problem that came about from Schapire’s framework is that one needs to check which
classes a given model can be perturbed to. Interestingly, there was some theoretical work in this
area given by (Awasthi et al). The work provides a way to check exactly that, but only in the case
of simple models. This however opens another area of research. Not only would this make boosting
based approaches much faster, but it would also advance the understanding of neural networks
considerably. The research in this area approaches adversarial robustness in a more methodical and
theoretical way than (Wong et al), which makes it a worthy direction to explore further.
This study will aim to adapt ADABOOST.MM for neural network training. This will fill the void of
boosted neural networks which seems to have been last seriously studied in 2000 by (Schwenk et al).
Even in the non-adversarial setting, this would be a novel achievement, because it provides a way
for anyone to ensemble their neural networks using ADABOOST.MM. It is particularly elegant,
because ADABOOST.MM picks the ideal weights αi for each weak learner in the ensemble. Then
further, we will examine what happens when we boost the state of the art adversarial learning
frameworks like (Wong et al), to see if ADABOOST.MM can consistently increase the accuracy for
those as well. All in all, this study would combine many facets of deep learning to hopefully use
the theoretically grounded work of Schapire and Mukherjee to improve empirically well performing
deep learning techniques.
4 Methodology
I will cover methodology for both of our main use cases, non-adversarial as well as adversarial. To
reiterate, the adversarial setting refers to modifying images with the intent of fooling the model
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(like the cat example from earlier), whereas non-adversarial is just standard learning. The non-
adversarial setting aims to show how to use ADABOOST.MM to increase the accuracy of regularly
trained neural networks. Specifically we describe a modification to ADABOOST.MM which makes
it practical to use on neural networks. This is applicable to any standard learning task, meaning
that anyone who wants to improve the performance of their models can use our implementation.
Second, the adversarial setting aims to show that ADABOOST.MM applied to adversarially trained
networks results in an adversarially robust ensemble.
What we find is that there are strong results in the non-adversarial setting. In the adversarial
setting, our ensemble has minor increases on adversarial examples, but interestingly, it has a large
increase on non-adversarial samples (while maintaining its accuracy on adversarial samples), which
is a novel and useful result.
4.1 Non-adversarial
Our non-adversarial contribution is to display that ADABOOST.MM can consistently boost accu-
racy on a standard MNIST and CIFAR-10 learning task. Furthermore, it will be important to show
that ADABOOST.MM will achieve higher accuracy than any single neural network could. We will
provide an implementation of ADABOOST.MM in pytorch1 which is ready to use with any neural
network architecture.
First we will begin with a review of ADABOOST.MM seen in figure 1. Boosting works by training
multiple ”weak learners” on varying subsets of the data, then all of these weak learners are put
together with different weights αi in an ensemble with the intent of making the ensemble accu-
racy higher than any individual ”weak learner” accuracy. The subset of the data that each weak
learner is trained on, and the weight α assigned to each weak learner is determined by the learning
algorithm. ADABOOST.MM does this in a slightly more complicated way because unlike most
boosting algorithms, this algorithm is truly multiclass. Instead of explicitly having a distribution
over examples, we instead have a cost matrix Ct where C(i, l) is the cost associated with predicting
class l on training example i. Essentially, each row represents a training example, and each column
represents a target class. A cost C(i, l) is positive when yi ̸= l and negative when yi = l.
Our implementation is close to what is listed here, however there are some aspects that are non
trivial to adapt for neural networks. The line ”Receive weak classifier hi . . . ” is non trivial for neural
networks. ADABOOST.MM expects the weak learner to minimize its error on the cost matrix Ct.
There are multiple ways to go about this, but the way we found to work the best was to convert the
cost matrix Ct into a distribution Dt. The rows of the cost matrix Ct gives us information on how
much further work is needed for each example. Rows with large absolute value sums will represent
samples for which some (example, class) pairs have high cost, so we want future weak learners to
1https://github.com/MLTheoryGT/AdversarialBoostingNeuralNets
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Figure 1: ADABOOST.MM Pseudocode
focus on these examples. Thus, each weak learner samples its training data by giving priority to
rows with larger absolute value sums.
In other words, given examples x1, ..., xn and batch size b the idea is to sample a batch of examples







Another aspect of ADABOOST.MM that is nontrivial for neural networks is the ensemble prediction
step. In order to test the ensemble’s adversarial robustness, we need the ensemble prediction
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to be differentiable, but ensemble prediction operation HT (x) = argmax kl=1FT (x, l) found in
ADABOOST.MM is non differentiable. Thus we replace this ensemble prediction method with a
differentiable operation, HT (x) =
∑
i
αiFi(xi) where Fi(xi) is the pre softmax logit of the ith weak
learner. This operator is just a simple linear combination of network outputs, which we found to
work fine experimentally.
Given these modifications we were able to run boosting experiments on neural networks using
the core ADABOOST.MM algorithm. It is important to understand these results because AD-
ABOOST.MM is proven by (Mukherjee and Schapire), to be an optimal multi-class boosting algo-
rithm, and there is no other work using this algorithm in this setting.
4.2 Adversarial
The boosting algorithm undergoes a slight change in the adversarial setting. The core idea of
boosting is that each consecutive weak learner focuses on samples that the previous weak learner
incorrectly predicted. However in the adversarial setting, consecutive weak learners should focus
on samples which were incorrectly predicted while the learner is under an adversarial attack. So to
parallel this in the adversarial setting we propose the following change to ADABOOST.MM. First,











where ∆ is our adversarial perturbation from a PGD attack. Second, we update f as follows
ft = ft1(i, l) + t1[ht(xi +∆) = l]
Both of these modifications serve to make our boosting algorithm optimize for the adversarial
accuracy of the ensemble rather than the standard accuracy.
In order to measure our accuracy we perform a standard Projected Gradient Descent(PGD) attack
on the ensembles. The details of this attack are described in (Madry et al). We use this attack after
the addition of each weak learner so we can see how the addition of further weak learners improves
the ensemble’s accuracy. Note that we are able to perform this attack directly on the ensemble
because we modified the ensemble prediction to be differentiable.
5 Discussion / Results
At a high level we see strong results in the nonadversarial case. The proposed idea to sample from
our defined distribution D seems to be working, because our nonadversarial accuracy increases as
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we add weak learners. Further, we see some increases in accuracy in the adversarial case. This is
bench marked by a standard 20 iterations of PGD. However, we do not have very large increases
in accuracy, suggesting further modifications to this method may be necessary. Interestingly, the
accuracy of our adversarial ensemble on non adversarial examples increases as we add weak learners
which is a useful result.
5.1 Non-adversarial Results
Here the goal is to show that ADABOOST.MM is a robust way to increase accuracy on any Neural
Network. In addition we will show that, a boosted approach results in higher accuracy than a single
model ever could. As we see in figure 2, the accuracy of neural networks grows logarithmically. What
we see in figure 3 and 4 is that by boosting, we are able to overcome the stagnant accuracy. In fact
we achieve a validation accuracy of over 94% whereas the single model has validation accuracy less
than 90%. Thus, this leads me to believe that ADABOOST.MM is a robust ensembling algorithm
which is effective for increasing the accuracy of neural networks.
Figure 2: Single model training and validation accuracy
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Figure 3: Ensemble training and validation accuracy, 500k samples per WL
Figure 4: Ensemble training and validation accuracy, 750k samples per WL
An interesting phenomenon we see here is that as we add more weak learners, the gap between
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train and validation accuracy seems to grow, which indicates some amount of over-fitting. This
phenomena is noted in (Barlett et al) and they indicate that this can happen because the complexity
of the ensemble is very high. Notably, to overcome this we may need to use weak learners with
smaller architectures in order to generalize better. However, despite this, the validation accuracy
still increases, which is ultimately what we optimize for. A potential further direction here would
be to understand why this gap occurs to reduce over-fitting.
These results are novel because this is the first study demonstrating the experimental success of
ADABOOST.MM as proposed in (Mukherjee and Schapire). In general, there has been a severe
lack of research surrounding boosted neural networks. Most notably we can compare to (Schwenk
et al) and (Badirli et al), however neither of these papers provide results on the industry standard
CIFAR10 dataset like we are.
In addition, one may compare our accuracy of 94% to the current state of the art accuracy from
(Foret et al) of 99.7%. However, this comparison is besides the point, because (Foret et al), is
using a different, much stronger architecture. Our results serve to show that using an arbitrary
architecture, the accuracy achieved by the ensemble is higher than that of the weak learner. In
our case we showed that the weak learner plateaus at 90% accuracy, but we are able to achieve
94% accuracy. A further direction would be to replicate these experiments on many neural net
architectures to ensure that ADABOOST.MM is a model independent way to boost accuracy.
5.2 Adversarial Results
Here the goal is to show how our boosting algorithm is able to improve upon the (Wong et al)
approach. Wong’s paper proposes a way to train individual neural networks adversarially. As we
see in figure 5, the adversarial accuracy of a single model tapers off over time. Then we see in
figure 6, the ensemble is able to slightly increase accuracy, but there is no general upward trend
which is concerning. So although this is able to increase the accuracy from 39% to 41%, this still
isn’t quite as good as just using the (Wong et al) approach, which is able to reach a 45% adversarial
accuracy for ϵ = 0.127.
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Figure 5: Single model adversarial test accuracy
Figure 6: Ensemble adversarial test accuracy
However, as we see in 7, the accuracy of this adversarially trained ensemble on standard samples in-
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creases by around 6% which is certainly significant. In the real world, the accuracy of an adversarial
model on standard examples is also very important, and here we have shown that ADABOOST.MM
is a way to improve that accuracy.
Figure 7: Accuracy of adversarial ensemble on non adversarial samples
So ultimately, this leads us to look into further ways to modify the boosting framework so that we
can achieve large increases in adversarial accuracy just as we are able to do in the non-adversarial
setting.
6 Conclusion/Future Works
The goal of this paper was twofold. First we aimed to demonstrate a way to use ADABOOST.MM
on neural networks and show that we get novel accuracy gains. We were able to show that AD-
ABOOST.MM is a consistent way to increase accuracy in the non-adversarial setting. This is a
novel and important result because boosting has not been studied in this setting for a long time.
We show that the theoretical work of (Mukherjee and Schapire) is backed up by experimental ev-
idence, specifically in the neural network setting. Moreover, we show the necessary modifications
that one should use in order to use ADABOOST.MM for neural networks. This is a significant
result because it provides anyone a way to increase the accuracy of their model, simply by applying
this boosting algorithm on top of it.
Second, we aimed to make further modifications to ADABOOST.MM to create an adversarially
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robust ensemble. The adversarial results, while not stellar, lead us to further look into the work
of (Abernethy et al) and find further modifcations to ADABOOST.MM so that we can improve
our adversarial accuracy. However, it does provide a useful side result, that being, the accuracy on
non-adversarial examples increases significantly.
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